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Dominance in College Football and
the Role of Scholarship Restrictions
Katherine Baird
University of Washington, Tacoma
This article examines the relationship between player compensation in college
football and competitive balance on the field. It shows that National Colle-
giate Athletic Association rule changes restricting football-player compensa-
tion are not associated with an improvement in football's competitive balance.
Although college football is marginally more balanced than professional sports
In any given year, an examination of cumulative records spanning numerous
seasons proves college football to be as unbalanced as professional sports.
The movement toward reducing player compensation, coincident with an in-
creasing value to player talent, raises issues over how the financial gain from
college football talent should be used. The significant degree of talent (and
financial) imbalance among college football teams suggests that more atten-
tion should be paid to the determinants of talent distribution in college foot-
baU.
At matiy Atnericati universities intercollegiate football produces significant
resources for school athletic departments. In 2002. for example, football provided
the University of Washington with a net of $15.8 million (P. King, personal com-
munication. December 23. 2(K)2) and Ohio State with a net of $20.3 million {Suggs,
2002). As researchers have long pointed out. the existence of such significant profits
in college football can be largely attributed to National Collegiate Athletic Asso-
ciation (NCAA) regulations limiting player compensation. Without such regula-
tions teams competing for players would bid up compensation levels, thereby re-
ducing football profits by driving up expenses. Many reasons have been advanced
for the curTent policy of restricting college players' pay; one of these is the need to
maintain competitive balance among college teams (Fort. 2003). Whether restric-
tions on college-player compensation improve competitive balance is debatable.
The relationship is important in that it bears both on the justification for restricting
college-players' pay and on who should benefit from the fmancial rewards gener-
ated by college football. The presumed relationship also applies to formulations of
remedies for alleviating competitive imbalances in college football.
The author Is with Interdisciplinary Arts and Sciences. University of Washington—
Tacoma. Tacoma, WA, 98402-3100,
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This article investigates the relationship between player compensation and
competitive balance in college football. Theory, as well a.s empirical evidence on
the relationship between the two, is ambiguous. The article examines this relation-
ship by analyzing competitive balance in Division IA college football (hereafter
college football) during the period 1985 to 2001 to see whether reductions in the
number of scholarships given to football players during this period have improved
competitive balance among college football teams. The degree of imbalance in
college football is also examined.
The findings show that, in any one year, college football is somewhat more
balanced than professional sports. Examining cumulative records spanning sev-
eral seasons, however, reveals that college football rivals professional sports in its
degree of competitive imbalance. Although perhaps not astounding to college foot-
ball fans, the study reveals both the degree of imbalance and the significant differ-
ences in competitive balance that exist among different college football onferences.
Unlike competitive balance in professional sports, this issue has received surpris-
ingly little attention among sports analysts. The analysis presented here indicates
that reductions in the number of football scholarships offered over this time period
have had no discernible impact on competitive balance in college football. It thus
supports claims made elsewhere with respect to professional sports, that redistrib-
uting a player's value to others will not improve balance (Butier, 1995; Fort, 2003;
Maxcy, 2002; Rottenberg, 1956).
The article is divided into three sections. Section 1 provides a background
on the issue of player compensation and competitive balance. Section 2 presents a
statistical analysis of" the relationship between recent reductions in player compen-
sation and competitive balance; it shows that there is no evidence linking increased
restrictions on pay with increased competitive balance. The analysis also reveals
the extent of competitive imbalance in college football and the differences among
various college football conferences. My conclusions are outlined in the third
section.
Background
Revenue and Player Restrictions
It is well documented that certain college football and basketball teams net
significant revenue for their institutions (Fort, 2(X)3; Noll, 1991; Sheehan. 2000;
Zimbalist, 1999). In fact, college football alone likely earns select educational
institutions hundreds of millions of dollars per year (Witosky, 2002; Zimbalist).
NCAA regulations play an important role in both the existence and distribution of
these financial gains. Most importantly, NCAA regulations limit athletes' com-
pensation to the nonmonetary benefits of tuition, books, and room and board. They
also limit the number of "full-ride" scholarships that each school can offer. In
football, NCAA regulations currently limit the annual numberof full-ride scholar-
ships to 85; before 1994 the NCAA allowed 95, and before 1988 it permitted 105.
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Schools undoubtedly compete rigorously for prospective star foothall play-
ers. If the NCAA imposed no restrictions, universities would certainly use financial
incentives of some soil to attract talented athletes because star football and basket-
ball athletes can generate tremendous revenue for some schools (Brown, 1993,
1994; Fort, 2003; Noll, 1991). NCAA regulations are binding, as made obvious by
the pervasiveness of NCAA sanctions against schools that attempt to get around
player pay restrictions. Moreover, with the expenses of fielding a top football team
growing over time, the pressure to circumvent restrictions has likewise increased.
For example, between 1985 and 2001 the amount of football revenue generated by
the highest earning school team grew from $10.7 million to $66.3 million (Witosky,
2002;Zimbalist. 1999. p. 160). The University of Washington's football revenue,
which is more typical of a top football team's revenue growth, more than doubled
between 1987 and 2001 (P. King, personal communication, December 23, 2002).
Given these fmancial trends, it is not surprising that, during the past 40 years, the
number of NCAA investigations into possible infractions of its regulations has
steadily increased (Depken & Wilson, 2002; Zimbalist).
Player Pay Restrictions and Competitive Balance.
There are a variety of justifications for NCAA player-compensation regula-
tions. The regulations, it is argued, improve competitive balance, maintain the
amateur nature of college sports, provide needed funds for schools' athletic pro-
grams, and make coaches more mindful of the academic potential of prospective
football recruits (Fort, 2003; P. Parker, personal communication, January 27, 2003).
The 2002-2{K)3 NCAA manual states that NCAA regulations are designed to ad-
vance 1 or more of 16 principles; one of these is the "principle of competitive
equity" whereby the NCAA '"shall promote opportunity for equity in competition
to assure that individual student-athletes and institutions will not be prevented
unfairly from achieving the benefits inherent in participation in intercollegiate ath-
letics" (NCAA, 2002, p. 5). Restricting pay is also said to be necessary to maintain
the special amateur nature of college football. Because school athletic programs
rarely break even, the money generated by football is an important source of rev-
enue for many athletic departments. Finally, the NCAA argues that scholarship
restrictions, particularly limits on a coach's ability to transfer the scholarship of a
player who drops out to another player, make coaches more mindful of the aca-
demic potential of their recruits. This was the official rationale for the NCAA's
decision to reduce the number of football scholarships in 1993 (P. Parker, personal
communication, January 27, 2003).
Player pay restrictions are commonly believed to promote competitive bal-
ance because fewer scholarships for football players will reduce the ability of bet-
ter teams to entice the best football prospects to their schools. As a result, talent
will be more evenly distributed throughout football conferences, allowing weaker
schools to field more competitive teams. Scholarship limits are. thus, thought to
help stop less wealthy teams from being "overpowered in the second half by big
squads from rich football schools" (Byers. 1995, p. 227).
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The belief that unbridled competition for players would lead to large imbal-
ances on the playing field is a widespread one because it is assumed that wealthier
or more successful schools would outcompete other schools for star players. Jim
Scherr. executive director of USA Wrestling, is quoted as saying: "It's time to
scale down to, say, 70 scholarships.... If football scholarships were decreased...
more of college football's have-nots would get a chance to compete with the behe-
moths in Division IA, which would make for more interesting games"' Such a
belief in the consequences of reduced scholarships is common among both college
and NCAA officials (Fort, 2003, p. 440).
Theory, however, is ambiguous about the consequences of greater competi-
tion for college football players in terms of talent distribution (Fort & Quirk, 1999).
If pay restrictions act as a salary cap, they might improve balance by reducing the
role of differential football revenue on the distribution of talent. It is certainly true
that college football teams in the same conferences generate vastly different rev-
enue for their schools. In the PAC-10 conference, for example, the University of
Washington's football team brought in $26.6 million in 2001, whereas Washing-
ton State's team brought in $7.1 million; in the SEC conference, Arkansas topped
the nation by bringing in $66.3 million, whereas Mississippi State's football team
brought in only $9.2 million (Witosky, 2002).
On the other hand, equal spending on football players by no means assures
equal spending on football per se. Schools could compete for players by differen-
tially investing in coaches, facilities, recruitment, training, tutoring, and other fac-
tors that influence a player's choice of school. For example, in 2001 twenty-two
colleges paid their football coaches salaries in excess of $1 million per year; these
salaries generally ranged from 4-8% of the team's total football revenue (Witosky,
2002), and only schools with high-revenue programs could justify paying them.
Such high salaries reflect the fact that many football players, motivated by ex-
pected future incomes, want to play for the teams and coaches that give them the
best chance of making the pros. As such, small changes in current "earnings'" could
have little eifect on players' decisions about whom to play for.
High expenditures on coaches' salaries by top-revenue teams suggest there
might be, as Fort (2003) argues, a college version of Rottenberg's invariance prin-
ciple. Rottenberg (1956) argued that, in professional sports, the location of player
talent should be invariant with restrictions on player pay. This theory, which has
received considerable empirical support in the literature, is now referred to as the
Rottenberg invariance principle.- In college football, top-revenue teams might lure
the best talent, not by paying them (which they would if they could), but by invest-
ing in the resources that are most valuable to players—coaches and facilities that
improve their odds of making the pros and nonmonetary benefits, such as travel
accommodations.
Although the invariance principle suggests that player pay restrictions in
college football will have no effect on competitive balance, some argue that these
restrictions could actually hinder weaker teams, thereby harming competitive
balance. With limited ability to compensate athletes, losing teams and weak
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conferences could be disadvantaged by NCAA regulations restricting player com-
pensation and, hence, disadvantaged in the competition for wins and revenue.
Previous Research
The effect of NCAA regulations on outcomes in college sports has long been
of interest to sports analysts. Many argue that the NCAA acts as a cartel to restrict
competition and output, thereby increasing the fmancial gains to schools (Becker,
1985; Fleisher, Goff, & Tollison, 1990; Koch, 1983; Noll, 1991); some further
argue that these regulations reduce competitive balance (Eckard. 1998).
Researchers have examined justifications of NCAA regulations through
empirical studies of the relationship between NCAA regulations and outcomes
such as rents derived from players and competitive balance on the field. Brown
(1993, 1994) and Leonard and Prinzinger (1984) examined the value of star play-
ers to colleges; their analyses showed that star basketball and football players dur-
ing the t980s could bring hundreds of thousands of dollars per year to a school.
Today the amount is certainly much higher. Fort (2003), for example, estimates
that quarterback Ryan Leaf brought at least $2-3 million to Washington State
University in 1998. Anecdotally, in 2001, the Ohio State football team netted (af-
ter all football expenses) $20.3 million for its athletic department (Suggs, 2002).
Dividing this amount by a squad of 100 players implies that the average amount
brought in by each football player, in excess of all football costs (including their
own scholarships), was $203,000.
In one of the earliest studies examining the relationship between NCAA
regulations and competitive balance, Fleisher et al. (1990) showed that NCAA
investigations of illegal practices disproportionately fall on up-and-coming teams;
they argued that NCAA sanctions make it harder for weaker teams to compete,
thus harming balance by protecting stronger teams from competition. Evidence in
Eckard (1998) supports this hypothesis; he argues that, since 1952, the NCAA's
enforcement of its regulations had resulted in a decrease in competitive balance in
college football. In Depken and Wilson's (2002) examination of the impact of
NCAA probations and investigations on competitive balance in college football,
they found that NCAA sanctions have had an ambiguous effect on football's com-
petitive balance: Although sanctions seem to fall disproportionately on weaker
teams, thereby reducing balance, they might also improve balance by discourag-
ing cheating among better teams.
Bennett and Fizel (1995) examined the claim that NCAA control over foot-
ball telecasts was necessary for maintaining balance among teams. Before 1985,
the NCAA maintained complete control over college football telecasts. The NCAA
claimed that this authority was necessary to assure a more even distribution of
team exposure and, hence, of recruitment advantage and team balance. After the
Supreme Court's 1984 decision in National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board
of Regents of the University of Oklahoma and University of Georgia Athletic Asso-
ciation, in which it was found that the NCAA's telecast monopoly violated the
Sherman Antitrust Act, Bennett and Fizel showed that competitive balance in
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football remained the same, contrary to the effect predicted in the NCAA's
arguments.
Sutter and Winkler (2003) looked at the role of scholarship restrictions on
competitive balance in college football. Their fmdings, that scholarship restric-
tions have little to no effect on competitive balance, support Rottenberg's invari-
ance principle. Their study, however, was largely based on an examination of overall
rather than conference win-loss records. As will be discussed later in the article,
conference records are a better indicator of competitive balance than are overall
records.
In short, little evidence supports the claim that NCAA regulations help level
the playing field; at best they appear to have had a very limited eftect. and, at
worst, they have served to strengthen the position of the dominant teams. An op-
portunity to further explore the effect of NCAA player pay regulations on com-
petitive balance is presented by recent changes in NCAA regulations concerning
player scholarships. In 1993 the NCAA decreased the number of scholarships tbat
Division IA teams could provide their football players from 95 to 85; this followed
a decision 5 years earlier that reduced the number of scholarships from 105 to 95.
Because this is the main form of immediate compensation that schools give to
their football players, a 10-plus percent reduction during a period of rising college
football revenue should have a noticeable eftect on competition, if indeed the NCAA
compensation regulations affect competition on the field at all. The current study,
thus, extends the work of Eckard (1998) by disaggregating measures of competi-
tive balance during the recent past, updates the period studied by Bennett and Fizel
{1995) that ended in 1993, and supplements the work of Depken and Wilson (2002)
and Bennett and Fizel by exclusively analyzing the effect of NCAA player-
compensation regulations on competitive balance. Finally, it extends Sutter and
Winkler's (2003) fmdings by examining conference rather than overall win-loss
records.
Competitive Balance in College Football
Football is the most lucrative among all college sports, and the one in which
NCAA regulations governing player compensation are the most binding. Do these
regulations improve competitive balance? Without knowing what balance on the
field would be like in the absence of NCAA player pay regulations, this is a diffi-
cult question to answer. What is known, however, is that football-player compen-
sation for top teams, relative to the income they generate, has declined over time.
As an example, during the last 10 years at the University of Washington, the rev-
enue generated by football has increased 71% whereas compensation to players
has increased by 43%; this means that, during this time period, the share of gross
football revenue being used to compensate athletes has declined at the University
of Washington from 4.2% in 1991 to3.5%in2001 (P. King, personal communica-
tion, December 23, 2002).' By comparison, in professional sports leagues in the
US, players generally receive slightly more than half of all gross revenues. In
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addition, in the NFL, players receive roughly two-thirds of all revenue (Fort, 2003).
This trend in college football is analogous to a successively more restrictive salary
cap, which theoretically could improve balance if it permitted every team, regard-
less of revenue, to acquire top football talent.
Measuring Competitive Balance
To examine whether or not greater restrictions on player compensation im-
prove competitive balance among college football teams, a definition of competi-
tive balance is needed. The idea is simple: more balance means that the player
talent pool is more equally distributed among teams, with the result that the distri-
bution of wins in a league or conference should be relatively even. One approach
to measuring the balance among teams is to treat a sports league (or conference) as
an industry and to measure the extent of competition in the "industry" by way of
measuring how concentrated the industry output is. One could quantify, for ex-
ample, the concentration of a league output—such as total wins, revenue, points,
or ticket sales—for a limited number of teams. Several researchers have used such
an approach to measure the concentration of wins (Depken, 1999) or conference
titles (Eckard, 1998) in college football. The concentration of revenue as an output
in college football might also be of interest but is exceptionally difficult to mea-
sure because different institutions employ different accounting conventions
(Sheehan, 2000).
A more common way to measure competitive balance in sports is to measure
the spread in teams' win/loss (W/L) percentages within a league or conference and
then to compare this spread with an ideal spread. This index was first advocated by
Scully (1989); it is used in Quirk and Fort (1997) for professional leagues and in
Fort (2003) and Bennett and Fizel (1995) for measuring competitive balance in
college football. It is also the most common measure used throughout the litera-
ture on competitive balance in sports (e.g., Butler, 1995; Lee & Fort. 2002;
Szymanski, 2001). Tbe index, the explanation of which follows, has intuitive ap-
peal; it is also useful as a means of comparing competitive balance in college
sports with that of professional sports because the index is used extensively in the
literature on professional sports.
An actual standard deviation for a league is calculated hy taking the differ-
ence between each team's W/L record and .5(X), squaring this difference, then
summing them by league or conference, and dividing by the number of teams.
This is the variance in league W/L records, and the square root of this is the stan-
dard deviation in W/L records for the league.
An idealized standard deviation is the theoretical standard deviation that
would result if all teams were equal so that the outcome of any match was equiva-
lent to the flipping of a coin. It is calculated for a league as 0.5 divided by the
square route of A', where A îs the nuinberof games per season played by each team
in the league, and .5 is the expected winning record of each team.
The ratio of the actual to idealized standard deviation in W/L records pro-
vides an index of competitive balance. A higher ratio indicates greater competitive
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imbalance. A ratio of I, or close to I, indicates perfect or near perfect balance.
Quirk and Fort's (1997, pp. 247fO detailed analysis of competitive balance in pro-
fessional sports leagues during the 20th century reveals annual ratios typically
between 1.5-2.5. Fort's (2003) analysis of the Pac-IO and Big 10 college football
conferences reveals annual competitive balance ratios of between 1.2 and 2.0 be-
tween 1970 and 2000.
Data
To analyze competitive balance in Division IA college football, the W/L
records of all Division IA teams were compiled for the period 1985-2001 (ties
were excluded). Because teams are organized into conferences and typically play
a majority of games in their conference, a distinction is made between conference
and overall records. Based on these records, the ratio of actual standard deviation
to idealized standard deviation for both conference records and overall records
was calculated for each conference and for each year.
Annual Measures of Competitive Balance
Table 1 lists the ratios by conference and year for in-conference records
only. As shown in Table 1, there is no obvious trend in competitive balance over
this period. The year in which the (unweighted) average measure of conference
competitive balance is best (lowest) was 1992, when the ratio of actual to ideal
standard deviations was 1.33. The year in which the average conference balance is
worst (highest) was 1988, when it was 1.53. Individual conferences show no obvi-
ous trend either. Comparing college football with professional sports, between
1970 and 1990 the annual measure of competitive balance in major-league base-
ball was 1.75, in the NBA it was 2.53. in the NFL it was 1.56, and in the NHL it
was 2.23 (Quirk & Fort, 1997, p. 247).
Figure 1 shows the moving five-year average of annual measures of com-
petitive balance for the major conferences over the study period: the Atlantic Coast
Conference (ACC), the Big 12, the Big Ten, the Mid-American Conference (MAC),
the Pac-10, and the Southeastern Conference (SEC). No overall trend is obvious,
although an upward trend indicating a decrease in balance is detectable in the SEC
and Pac-IO over this time period.
These measures of competitive balance in college football show generally
what Fort (2003) has shown for two college football conferences since 1970, and
Bennett and Fizel (1995) show for major conferences during the 1980s: competi-
tive balance in college football has remained quite stable over the last 40 years and
is somewhat better than competitive balance in professional sports leagues. It also
reveals that balance and trends vary somewhat by conference. Balance appears
particularly poor in the Big 12 and ACC, whereas historically it was better in the
PAC-10. Such differences appear to be diminishing with time, however.
A statistical comparison of the pre-1994 era with the post-1994 era reveals
that 1994 did not signal a significant change in competitive balance for the better.
If anything, balance has become worse—statistically so in the case of the Pac-IO,
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Figure I — Annual competitive balance indicators in division IA conferences: 1985-
2001 (in-conference play).
SEC, and ACC (see Figure 2). Only in the now-nonexistent Big West (formerly the
PCAA) was there a statistically significant improvement in competitive balance
from pre-1994 to post-1994; the annual indicator dropped from an average of 1.43
(1985-1993) to 1.22 (1994-2001), a difference significant at the 5% level of con-
fidence. Figure 2 shows conference-by-conference comparisons during the two
periods. This suggests preliminary support for Rottenberg's invariance principle:
where talent goes (and thus competitive balance) is invariant with the degree of
restrictions over player pay. No statistically significant change in competitive bal-
ance has occurred in college football since greater restrictions over paying athletes
have been introduced.
The trends in balance just mentioned are based on intraconference play only.
Competitive balance, however, among all Division IA football teams, as measured
by the spread in overall records, is not too different from the spread that results
from in-conference play. This is shown in Figure 3, which compares the unweighted
average conference measure of competitive balance for in-conference play with a
measure for overall play among all Division IA teams. For in-conference play
during this period, the average varies from about 1.4 to 1.52 (based on three-year
moving averages). For overall play, the average varies between 1.38 and 1.5.
It is surprising that overall college football records prove about as balanced
{or imbalanced) as conference play; a common presumption is that college football
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A C C " BIG 10 MAC PAC 10* SEC" BIG BIG 12 WAC BIG EAST Average
Conference
Figure 2 — Average annual competitive balance in division IA football by conference:
1985-1993 and 1994-2001. *Difference significant at tbe 5% level of significance. **Dif-
ference significant at tbe 10% level of significance.
•2 140
1987 198S 1989 1990 19S1 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
3-Year moving average
Figure 3 — Annual competitive balance in division IA football 1985-2001: conference
only vs. overall play.
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teams are more balanced in their conferences than they are in the nation at large. In
college football, however, interconference team matchups are somewhat endog-
enous to past play: The best teams tend to play each other, as do the worst. More-
over, this tendency has intensified with the increasing financial gains to be made
from exciting interconference matchups. For this reason an analysis of footbairs
balance based on overall play is not particularly Insightful: increasing (decreas-
ing) balance could result from the arrangement of matchups rather than an im-
provement (decline) in the distribution of player talent.
Team Dominance
Competitive imbalance from year to year—some big winners, some big
losers—is less important if individual team and conference fortunes vary by year.
If good (and bad) seasons are equally distributed among teams in a conference,
then, over the long term, no single team will dominate conference play, and bal-
ance could be considered quite good despite uneven outcomes in any one year. A
separate question, then, is whether or not there has been a change in long-run
domination in college football. One could examine long-term dominance by ana-
lyzing the concentration of conference championships, national rankings, or bowl
appearances over time or by examining cumulative W/L records.
To examine long-term dominance within each football conference, competi-
tive balance indicators are calculated here based on teams' cumulative W/L records.
This measure not only permits comparison with professional sports, but it also
better captures persistent variation in teams' ability to win games.
Table 2 shows competitive-balance indicators by conference for the two pe-
riods under consideration. These indicators are based on cumulative W/L record
over the period 1985-1993, and 1994—2001. The time period with more generous
football scholarships (105 and 95) is separated from the current, more stringent
standard of 85. Did decreasing the permitted number of football scholarships coin-
cide with a decrease in the domination of conferences by certain teams?
Immediately noteworthy in Table 2 is the extent of college football imbal-
ance based on several years of cumulative records. This supports what most col-
lege football fans already know: some teams are perpetual winners, and some teams
are perpetual losers. Over the period 1985-1993, the weighted average of all con-
ference competitive balance indicators is 3.06, and over the period 1994-2001, it
is 2.83. These numbers indicate significant and persistent differences among teams
in each Division IA conference in their ability to win games.
As seen in Table 2, balance improved with fewer scholarships in some con-
ferences, whereas, in others, it declined. From this longer term perspective, com-
petitive balance appears best in the Pac-10 conference, where it was 2.6 in the
1985-1993 period and 2.21 in the 1994-2001 period. Average measures of confer-
ence dominance during the two periods, however, has neither changed signifi-
cantly in magnitude (the change from 3.06 to 2.83 represents an 8 % decrease) nor
in a statistical sense (the difference is statistically insignificant even at the 80%
level of confidence). Thus, based on longer term records, as well as annual records,
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Note. Comparison is based on annual and cumulative records (1985-2001). 'Weights
based on number of games played. ''Difference statistically insignificant at the 80% level
of confidence.
the evidence here does not suppotl the position that scholarship reductions im-
proved balance on the playing field. It does support Rottenberg's invariance prin-
ciple, however, that scholarship restrictions should have no effect on competitive
balance.
The previous analysis also reveals that what is true in professional sports is
also true in college football: the longer the time frame over which winning records
are compiled, the more imbalanced play on tbe field is. To underscore this,
competitive-balance indicators for college football were calculated based on cu-
mulative conference records over the entire period from I985-2(X)1. Not surpris-
ingly, competitive-balance indicators show that the balance is worse than for ei-
ther of the shorter time periods. In all major conferences, competitive-balance
indicators exceed 3.0, and the weighted average of all conferences is 3.8. This is
summarized in Figure 4, which shows that in almost every conference, competi-
tive balance worsens as the time frame over which team records are considered
lengthens. This reveals both the degree of imbalance within conferences, as well
as differences in the degree of competitive imbalance among conferences. Why
balance is so much worse in some conferences than others is an important question
because it bears on NCAA policies that attempt to improve fairness and the ability
of any one school to build a winning team.
So how dominant are the best teams in college football7 Table 3 shows the
cumulative W/L percentage for select teams and conferences over the period 1985-
2(X)1 in order to compare long-run dominance in college football with long-run
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Conferences
Figure 4 — Competitive balance in division IA football by conference: annual vs. cu-
mulative records 1985-2001.
dominance in professional sports. The first column shows the number of standard
deviations each team's record is above .500. It. thus, presents another measure of
how far each team's record is from the assumption that each team is equally com-
petitive. This calculation allows a comparison of long-run dominance in college
foothal! with that found in professional sports. Quirk and Fort (1997, pp. 264ff)
calculate the number of standard deviations each professional team's lifetime record
is above a .500 record.
With the exception of a few teams (e.g., the New York Yankees, the Boston
Celtics, the Los Angeles Lakers, and the Montreal Canadians), team records lie
between ±7 standard deviations of a .500 record, roughly the same range found in
college football. In college football between 1985 and 2001, 22% of cumulative
team records are close to .500 (within ± 1 standard deviation of a .500 record); this
compares favorably with professional football, where only 13.3% of teams are this
close to .5(X), but unfavorably with professional basketball, where 34.6% of team
lifetime records are near a .500 record.
On the other end, nearly one-third of college football teams' cumulative
records are far from a .500 record (beyond ±3 standard deviations). This percent-
age is better than that of professional baseball, in which over 50% of baseball
teams' are this far from .500, but is comparable to professional basketball, in which
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Table 3 Top Winning and Losing College Football Teams By Division IA
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UT El Paso -4.94
Weighted average 3.80
'Based on assumption of equal playing strengths. ''Actual/ideal standard deviation. Based
on conference-only play, cumulative records 1985-2001, and excludes ties.
31 % of team records are this imbalanced. Judging by these measures, then, persis-
tent dominance and weakness among the teams is about as much a characteristic
of college football as it is of professional sports.''
Conclusions
To date, research on the role of player pay in competitive-balance outcomes
in college football has been theoretically and empirically uticlear. Understanding
this relationship is important insofar as it pertains to the justification for player pay
restrictions—restrictions that are becoming more severe as the revenue that play-
ers generate increases. Understanding the determinants of competitive balance is
important, too, because it influences tbe issue of how fairly the increasing finan-
cial gains (and losses) in college football are distributed among teams. Evidence
indicates that a school's revenue from football is related to the school's ability to
win football games (Padilla & Baumer, 1994); a persistent lack of competitive
balance suggests an unequal, and possibly unfair, division of the gains from col-
lege football across different schools.
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In an era of rising financial rewards for select college athletic departments,
assessing the effectiveness and fairness of existing institutions in distributing these
gains is important. Rising football revenue (either actual or potential) has fostered
rapid increases in expenditures on football facilities and coaches" salaries (Sokolove,
2002; Witosky. 2002). Paradoxically, however, this also coincides with decreases
in the share of revenue going to the players themselves.
Unlike professional sports, the degree of imbalance in college football has
received surprisingly little attention. Do competitive-balance concerns help jus-
tify restrictions on player pay? Do they contribute to leveling the playing field?
This study reveals tbat college football play departs substantially from an ideal of
complete competitive balance on the field. Even if it were the case that restrictions
on player compensation do, ceteris paribus, improve balance, then, clearly, this
alone is hardly sufficient to bring about a reasonable amount of balance within
(and among) college conferences. To the contrary, however, the findings here sup-
port the position that restrictions on player pay^analogous to a salary cap in pro-
fessional sports—have had no effect on college football's competitive balance.
The coincidence of rising (and more uneven) financial rewards in college
football (Fort, 2003; Zimbalist, 1999) with increased restrictions on player com-
pensation raises important questions of fairness in the distribution of financial
gains from college football that accrues to the athletes. For this reason it is impor-
tant to understand the role of the NCAA in ameliorating or contributing to the
persistence of competitive imbalance in college football. It could be that the redis-
tribution inherent in NCAA player-compensation rules alone is sufficient justifi-
cation for NCAA regulations: these rules do provide additional resources for col-
lege athletic programs, and they might add to fans' enjoyment of the game. That
they are necessary for balance on the field, however, thus far remains an unsub-
stantiated claim.
A possible future inquiry could examine the determinants of competitive
balance among different college football conferences. Such a study would quan-
tify the importance of player pay vis-a-vis factors such as a school's winning tradi-
tion, coach's salary, location of the school, money spent on facilities, academic
standards, and so forth. This would allow identification of the factors most impor-
tant to greater balance, and, thus, the NCAA policies that would best remedy com-
petitive imbalances in college football. With the increasing monetary gains (and
losses) associated with college football, the importance of balance among schools
in fielding competitive teams has increased significantly.
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Notes
'Quoted in The NCAA News Comment (March 27,2000), available at www.ncaa.com
'An example of the Rottenberg invariance principle is that the introduction of com-
petitive labor markets in professional sports ("free agency") has not corresponded with
declines in competitive balance (Butler, 1995; Maxcy. 2002).
^Tlie calculations are based on compensation if all players were in-state residents.
Going back farther in time also reveals a steady decline in the percent of total football
revenue at the University of Washington used to compensate athletes (P. King, personal
communication, December 23, 2(X)2).
•"For college football, these indicators are based on, at most, 17 years of play: for
professional sports. Quirk and Fort calculate them based on lifetime play. Examining col-
lege football teams' lifetime records might well reveal an even larger percentage of team
records falling within the extreme tails of a normal distribution. If so, perpetual dominance
and weakness among teams might be even more characteristic of college football than of
professional sports.
